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Abstract
A core ingredient of the the Internet of Things (IoT) is the use of
deeply embedded resource constrained devices, often connected to the
Internet over Low Power and Lossy Networks. These constraints com-
pounded by the need for unsupervised operation within an untrusted en-
vironment create considerable challenges for the secure operation of these
systems. In this paper, we propose a novel method to secure an edge IoT
network using the concept of key pre-distribution proposed by Eschenauer
and Gligor in the context of distributed sensor networks. First, we inves-
tigate the performance of the unmodified algorithm in the Internet of
Things setting and then analyse the results with a view to determine its
performance and thus its suitability in this context. Specifically, we in-
vestigate how ring size influences performance in order to determine the
required ring size that guarantees full connectivity of the network. We
then proceed to propose a novel RPL objective function and associated
metrics that ensure that any node that joins the network can establish
secure communication with Internet destinations.
1 Introduction
In recent years, with the development of wireless sensor networks, the Internet
of Things (IoT) became a reality. This presents many challenges that also did
not exist before because of the nature of the IoT. Since the IoT is a collec-
tion of heterogeneous networks, it involves not only the same security problems
with sensor network, but also more particular ones, such as privacy protection
problem, heterogeneous network authentication and access control problems,
information storage and management [1].
The research into the IoT security is far more complicated then that of the
Internet security in general. Conventional security protocols for the Internet as
we know are not suitable for the Internet of Things. Devices in the IoT are
different in terms of computation capabilities, memory limitation, processing
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power and physical limitation (i.e., installed in rural area and unattended). Thus
factors such as reliability, scalability, modularity, interoperability, interface and
QoS can be hard to achieve [2].
Security of the Internet of Things is at the centre of research. The impact
of security breaches on humans in an IoT device is much greater than in con-
ventional networks. For example, a breach of a device monitoring the CO2 level
in a room can lead to physical harm to a human being if this device is com-
promised and is sending data that are not accurate. Thus authentication and
authorization are key to ensuring that only authenticated devices (those that
share a suitable key) can join the network. The main challenge, when it comes
to authentication of various IoT devices, is the design of key storage and distri-
bution mechanisms, because of the nature of the IoT devices and their network
architecture [3].
Given the limitation that IoT devices (sensors and actuators) are constrained
in term of computational power and storage memory, several of the conventional
security methods are not suitable for use.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance of Laurent Es-
chenauer and Virgil D. Gligor’s Algorithm [4] for Distributed Sensor Networks
(DSN) in the context of IPv6 Low Power and Lossy Networks (6LoWPAN)
Devices for the Internet of Things (IoT). We provide an analysis of the perfor-
mance of the algorithm when applied in the DSN and IoT context. We also
show the ring size needed to guarantee full network connectivity. We then pro-
pose a modification of the routing protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks
(RPL) Objective function (OF) in order for the key pre-distribution algorithm
to achieve a full network connectivity in the context of the IoT.
Section 2 provides an introduction to the Internet of Things, the 6LoWPAN
network protocol, the IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks
(RPL) and several solutions that attempts to secure the Internet of Things.
Section 3 presents the key pre-distribution algorithm by Eschenauer and Gligor
in [4]. In section 4, we present the experiment methodology and design that
we carried in order to first validate the results of [4] and second to determine
whether those results are applicable in the context of the IoT. In section 5 we
provide an overview of the future work that will be carried on to enable key
pre-distribution algorithm to become a suitable solution for the IoT. Finally, we
present our main conclusions in Section 7.
2 Understanding the Problem: Literature Re-
view
Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN) include a large array of sensor nodes that
are usually battery powered, have limited computational capabilities and mem-
ory. Nodes in a DSN network, collect data and make it available for processing
to application components of the network and control nodes. The scale of a
DSN network is quite large (tens of thousands). The Internet of Things (IoT)
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network is a collection of sensor networks (Wireless and Distributed) that share
the same characteristics as Distributed Sensor Networks.
2.1 Internet of Things and 6LoWPAN
Internet of Things is a simple low cost communication network that allows
wireless connectivity in applications with limited power and relaxed throughput
requirements [5]. 6LoWPAN concept originated from the idea that “the Internet
Protocol could and should be applied even to the smallest devices” and that low-
power devices with limited processing capabilities should be able to participate
in the Internet of Things [6].
Internet protocols has always been considered too heavy for sensor networks
and thus the 6LoWPAN protocol stacks were created. The need for an IP
based sensor network made many researchers attempt to adapt existing Internet
standards to the creation of interoperable protocols and the development of
supporting mechanisms for composable services [7]. Not surprisingly, one of
these challenges is security because of the distinct features of sensor networks
such as the capabilities of the nodes. In section 2.3, we will review the various
attempts to create new security protocols for sensor networks and the IoT or to
adapt existing protocols in the context of the IoT.
Given those limitations, another problem arises with IP for the 6LoWPAN
network stacks that is relevant to this paper, the topology of the network. Vari-
ous topologies should be supported by 6LoWPAN networks including mesh and
star. Routing for Low Power and Lossy network (RPL) as described in [8], is a
routing protocol for 6LoWPAN networks that can solve this problem.
2.2 Routing for Low Power and Lossy Networks RPL
The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is a distance
vector IPv6 routing protocol designed for LLN networks. RPL is designed for
networks which comprise of thousands of nodes where the majority of the nodes
have very constrained energy and/or channel capacity. To conserve precious
resources, a routing protocol must generate control traffic sparingly. However,
this is at odds with the need to quickly propagate any new routing information
to resolve routing inconsistencies quickly.
RPL organises its topology in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). An RPL
DAG must have at least one RPL root and a Destination Oriented DAG (DODAG)
is constructed for each root. The root acts as a sink for the topology by storing
all routes to all nodes in the DODAG in the routing table. The root may also
act as a border router for the DODAG to allow nodes that belong to different
DODAGs to communicate [8].
RPL supports three security modes: unsecured, preinstalled and authenti-
cated. Unsecured refers to the security mechanism that is provided in lower
layers such as link layer security. Preinstalled and authenticated modes require
the use of preinstalled shared keys on all nodes prior to deploying the nodes.
Both modes provide security procedures and mechanisms at the conceptual level
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and are concerned with authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data
integrity and non repudiation. This study focuses on the preinstalled mode as
a method of securing message transmission between nodes in an RPL DAG
instance.
Authentication in the preinstalled mode involves the mutual authentication
of the routing peers prior to exchanging route information (i.e. peer authenti-
cation) as well as ensuring that the source of the route data is from the peer
(i.e. data origin authentication) [9]. The limitation of the preinstalled mode in
its common form, is that it is assumed that a node wishing to join a secured
network is pre-configured with a shared key for all neighbours and the RPL
root. This means that once this shared key is compromised, all network leaves
in the RPL DODAG are compromised.
2.3 Security for the Internet of Things proposed solutions
Providing key management for confidentiality and group level authentication in
a sensor network is difficult due to the ad hoc nature and limited resources of
the distributed sensor network environment. The main challenge in public key
algorithms when using in the context of Internet of Things, similarly to sensor
networks, is the energy consumption of exchanging public key certificates [10].
Key management protocols can be divided into three categories. Arbitrated
keying protocols, Self Enforcing protocols and Pre-Deployed Keying protocols.
Arbitrated keying protocols requires a trusted server such as the use of [11].
They are not suitable for use in the context of the IoT because of the limited
energy, communication bandwidth and computational capacities of sensor nodes
in an IoT network. The Otway-Rees protocol in [12] is applied in the context of
the IoT for one-way authentication; symmetric cryptography with AES is used
for encryption. The drawback in one way authentication is that it leaves the
network vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Self Enforcing protocols such as Pairwise Asymmetric Keying are based
on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. A proposed solution to use a
lightweight DTLS based keying mechanism to secure IoT was suggested in [13].
Although this solution proved to provide a lighter and robust security proto-
col using pairwise key establishment between nodes, the number of message
transfers to establish the secure connection in [13] still introduced a large com-
munication overhead. Pre-deployed keys into nodes prior to deployment in a
network offers energy efficient solution to providing confidentiality and group
level authentication keys [10].
In the next section we investigate the use of the key management scheme for
Distributed Sensor Networks proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [4] in the
context of the Internet of Things.
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3 Key Pre Distribution as a solution for Secur-
ing IoT
Oﬄine key pre-distribution algorithm for DSN by Eschenauer and Gligor [4]
describes the method by which keys are distributed to nodes in the network.
This key pre-distribution mechanism ensures that for each direct link be-
tween any two nodes in the network, the probability of those two sharing at
least a key is 0.5. The authors of [4] concluded that the size of key rings and
identifier rings RING does not need to be large in order for a network to guar-
antee full connectivity and only 50% of those pair of nodes need to have a shared
key.
At first, a large pool P of keys K and identifiers I is generated. Each key
K in the pool is randomly represented by one of the identifiers I. A certain
number of identifiers K and their respective keys K are picked from the pool P
randomly and loaded into the memory of the node. This will form the key ring
and the identifier ring. This step will be repeated for each node that wishes to
join the network.
Now that each node in the network has an identifier ring and a key ring
loaded into its memory, nodes can begin the phase of selecting a secure route
to any other nodes. Each node broadcast its identifier ring to all neighbour-
ing nodes (neighbouring nodes are the nodes that are within it is transmission
range). Each neighbouring node compares the identifier ring it received with its
own identifier ring. If the node find a shared identifier between the two identifier
rings, it sends a message to the origin node with the shared identifier. Nodes
that have a shared identifier can establish a secure direct link by using the key
that corresponds to the shared identifier. Nodes that do not share an identifier
with the origin node will attempt to create a link with it through other nodes
(indirect links by hops).
An example in [4] showed that when a pool contained 100,000 keys, full
network connectivity was achieved with only 75 keys in the rings. This is due to
the fact that routing in Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN) allows multi hops
and indirect hop communication between nodes, thus nodes that do no share an
identifier can use another node that it shares an identifier with as an indirect
link to reach it.
This paper is attempting to evaluate the performance of this algorithm in
the context of the IoT environment when using RPL.
4 Experiment Design and Setup
The experiment was simulated on the Contiki Operating System [14] using
Cooja nodes simulator [15]. A C program was coded to generate keys pool,
IDs pool, Key rings, ID rings 1. The simulation file was composed of N nodes
1Keys & identifiers were generated randomly using Blum Blum Schub generator. Each
node will then choose a set of Keys & identifiers for its key ring and identifier ring randomly
using Knuth Shuﬄe algorithm.
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and one border router 2. A script was written in order for the simulation to
stop running only when all possible routes were computed and no more routes
exist. This was essential to ensure that the routing table we obtain at the end of
each simulation is the optimum one for our setting. Finally, a Perl program was
coded to analyse logs generated by individual nodes after simulation in order to
determine if nodes were able to establish a secure link.
4.1 Experiment parameters
The parameters selected for the simulation experiments aim to approximately
match the characteristics of a recent innovative deployment of IoT technology
at the campus of the University of Liverpool in the UK, where 650 students
were able to employ a smartphone app to access discounts or coupons in stores
or cafeterias, as well as for wayfinding and alerting. Specifically, the overall
area of 250x250 meters which is a typical area size of a medium sized university
campus. Number of users (Network size) is based on an average number of wifi
usage at Birbkeck campus during a day which is 2394 users [17]. The main
difference between out simulations and the use case we use for motivation is the
wireless technology used which was Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) while in the
simulations we use Zigbee.
Parameters related to the environment (control parameters) of the simula-
tion were defined in the experiment configuration. We assumed that the trans-
mitting range for each node is 50 meters (this is the common transmitting range
for 6LoWPAN low power devices). We also used the key length klength of 64
bits and the ID length ilength of 32 bits. Those two sizes were chosen as they
are enough, given the number of nodes we simulated in the experiment. The
number of bits in ID was chosen to be smaller because of memory constraints in
the Internet of things devices. The other reason is that exchanging IDs is not
revealing anything as there is no connection between keys and IDs is exchanged.
Anyone trying to intercept the messages will not be able to make the connection
between the identifer exchanged and the key it represents.
We carried out the experiment simulations with three different parameters
(independent parameters) changing. The Pool size P of keys is the first param-
eter. Two pools are being generated in each simulation, one for keys, the other
for IDs. Both have the same size. The pool size is an important factor that will
have a huge impact on the probability of shared keys between motes. The pools
size we run simulations for are: 100, 250, 500,750,1,000 and 2,500 motes. The
second parameter is the network size N . The third parameter is the ring size RS
It was computed using Stirling equation as per [4]. Those independent variables
are shown below and in table 1. For each pool size (P), keys and identifers are
generated once for all networks size. To ensure the accuracy of experiment sim-
ulations, each simulation will run 5 times. The largest and smallest results were
discarded and the average of the remaining three runs is used. The outputs of
2A border router is also the root of the RPL DODAG and it will store the routing table
of the simulation (acting as a sink).
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Figure 1: Number of nodes Vs Percentage of shared keys for various pools size
each of those experiments are the Number of DAGs DAGs in the routing table
and the Number of Shared Keys NSK between nodes that formed a DAG.
Table 1: Independent Variables
Pool size (P) Ring size (RS) Network size (N)
100 8 100
250 13 100 250
500 18 100 250 500
750 22 100 250 500 750
1,000 25 100 250 500 750 1,000
2,500 41 100 250 500 750 1,000 2,500
4.2 Experiment Results and Analysis
Fig. 1 shows the percentage of shared keys for various pools size when changing
the density of nodes in the network in a small environment of 250 by 250.
As we can see from fig. 1, the result of percentage of shared keys in the DAGs
becomes consistent around 50%. If the network simulated is a Distributed Sensor
Network, a 50% of links between various nodes in the DSN network sharing a
key is enough to guarantee full connectivity of the network. In a DSN network,
nodes that do not share a key can use a neighbouring node as an indirect link
as long as the link is secure. This will mean that it will take the connection
between two nodes two hops rather than a direct link but both of them will
be secure. However this network is an IoT network, therefore nodes that do
not share a key in the routing table will be discarded. Point to Point links in
RPL routing is not allowed therefore an alternative multihop secure link can
not exist.
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Fig. 2 represents the ring size vs the percentage of shared keys in the DAG
for various Network size. In this graph, it is very clear that the percentage of
shared key %NSK is hovering around the 50%. We can also validate from fig. 2
that the size of the ring calculation used in [4] generated a 50% shared keys
between nodes in the DSN network. The percentage of DAGs that contains a
shared key can also be validated for IoT as 50% of the RPL routing table leaves
had a common key ( %NSK) in the ring.
Figure 2: Ring size Vs Percentage of shared keys for various networks size
However, in a Distributed sensor network as in [4], if two nodes do not share
a key they can still communicate using an indirect link (multi-hop). In an IoT
network using RPL routing, multi hop alternative route is not possible. A node
is only able to communicate with its preferred parent as per the routing table.
In our experiment, if this node does not share a key with its preferred parent,
then the link between those two nodes does not exist. Therefore the node will
not be in the routing table and any sub leaves will also be discarded. fig. 3
show a simulation example of a 100 nodes network and how the routing table
for a small subset of this network appear when simulated in the context of the
Distributed Sensor Networks versus in the context of the Internet of Things.
From this figure we can conclude that many nodes will be discarded if we use
the key pre-distribution algorithm in its current form. This will result in an
IoT network a lot smaller than the one we started with. The remaining nodes
that were discarded, if the algorithm left as it is, will have to start the process
of randomly selecting a new key ring and identifier ring. Nodes in the routing
table will then check again whether all leaves in the routing table share a key.
4.3 Larger Key Rings
Having a small ring size for a considerably large network is a characteristic of
the key pre-distribution algorithm in [4]. However and as shown in table 2,
the rings size used for previous experiment did not achieve full connectivity of
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(a) Network subset (b) Routing table for DSN (c) Routing table for IoT
Figure 3: Comparison of routing table for a snippets from a simulation of 100
nodes in the context of DSN Vs. IoT
Table 2: Simulation experiments over various rings size
Original
values
Experiment
1 2 3 4 5 6
N RS SK % RS SK % RS SK % RS SK % RS SK % RS SK % RS SK %
100 8 50.52 18 84.16 22 100
250 13 50.43 30 98.18 36 100
500 18 57.14 30 83.17 45 99.07 48 100
750 22 49.47 30 71.95 45 92.87 60 99.40 63 100
1,000 25 57.14 30 63.44 45 89.28 60 97.32 75 99.53 77 100
2,500 41 48.19 45 59.37 60 92.46 75 97.11 100 99.64 104 100
the network. One alternative that we thought is essential to investigate is the
size of the ring. Table 2 below show how we experimented with the ring size,
modifying it until we reached 100% connectivity of the network.
Fig. 4 show a comparison of rings size when the key pre-distribution algo-
rithm is used in distributed Sensors network and in RPL over IoT network for
various network sizes. It is very clear that the size of the ring that achieves a
full network connectivity in [4] does not apply to the Internet of Things network
when using RPL. To achieve full connectivity of the network, a ring size of 77
key/identifier is needed for a pool size of 1000 in comparison of a ring size of
25 key/identifier for the same pool. This is a big difference that will have a
large impact on the network performance. Fig. 5 show the rings size needed
for various network sizes to achieve a guaranteed full connectivity between all
nodes within the RPL routing table.
As we can see from table 2 above, 104 keys were needed in the key ring to
achieve a 100% guaranteed connectivity in the RPL routing table in comparison
with only 41 keys in a ring needed for DSN networks . We have used 64 bits
key and 32 bits identifier. This will mean that key ring and identifier ring will
take up around 1.38 kb of memory storage in each node. In this experiment, we
have also used Zolertia node Z1 which features a powerful a 16-bit RISC CPU,
16MHz clock speed, 8KB RAM and a 92KB Flash memory. This means that at
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Figure 4: Various Rings size to achieve 100% of shared keys for different Pool
size
Figure 5: Rings size in DSN Vs. Rings size in IoT for various Pool size for 100%
connectivity
least 90 kB of Flash memory is still free to use for operating system and other
applications.
However, the original plan was to use as in [4] a pool of 100,000. A simple
calculation can give us an estimation of 4,600 keys and identifiers in each ring
in order to guarantee connectivity in the network using RPL protocol. Ring
size of 4,600 keys and identifiers will take up around 54 kb of memory storage
in each node. That is more than half of the memory present for the Zolertia
node (Zolertia[18] has the largest amount of memory in Contiki. TMote sky
node [19] is widely used and it has only 48 kb of memory which is not enough
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if using 4,600 keys and identifiers in each ring).
Computation overhead is another aspect that needs to be looked at. Com-
paring two identifiers rings will require a processing power that is very scarce.
When running the same experiment using 4,600 and 104 keys in a ring, we note
that during comparison of the key ring between two nodes, nodes processing
power were around 87% used for 23 seconds. We can conclude that for a larger
key ring size, nodes will not be able to cope with the computation power re-
quired and this will add a huge overhead on the network performance and the
routing table establishment.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we investigated the performance of the key pre-distribution al-
gorithm for distributed sensor networks on the IoT devices. We experimented
with the variables and simulated small scale networks of 100 nodes to large
scales network of 2500 nodes. Up until this point, we believe we have proved
that the key pre-distribution algorithm achieve the 50% probability of the nodes
to have a shared key, however it does not guarantee a full connectivity of the
network when used in the context of the IoT. The use of RPL protocol in IoT
gives a 0.45 probability of leaves in the RPL table with a shared key, which
means that not all the network is able to communicate as the RPL only uses
leaves that are in the routing table.
The next step in this research will be to explore alternatives solutions to
secure leaves in the RPL routing table that do not share a key. In the coming
few months, we will be developing a new Objective function metric.
The Objective Function uses several routing metrics to form the DODAG
based on some algorithm or calculation formulas. Metrics are carried in DAG
metric containers embedded in the DIO messages. The DAG metric containers
at the moment are divided into two categories, node metrics and link metrics.
In node metrics, nodes exchange information metrics about node state, node
energy and hop count. in Link metric, nodes exchange link related information
such as throughput, latency and link reliability.
We propose to add Shared Identifier Secure Link Objective Function (SISLOF)
to RPL objective function metrics. SISLOF objective function will be used to
quantify the shared key discovery (node metric) between two nodes that can
form a direct link (neighbouring node) using a Boolean value, of 0 or 1, where 0
indicates that the two nodes do not share a common identifier and 1 indicates
that the two nodes do share one or more common identifier. Further to this, the
SISLOF will compute other link metrics in order to determine the suitability
of the link if two links exist both with a shared key, in term of ETX and node
rank.
By doing this, we ensure that any node that joins the routing table can com-
municate securely as only the nodes that fulfil the requirement of the SISLOF
will be able to join the RPL DODAG.
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